By Pradeep N
1. Introduction
India is one of nine states in the world that possess nuclear weapons, and one of only four nuclear-armed states that have never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its nuclear journey is distinctive: it combines a self-image as a long-standing champion of global disarmament with a determination to retain an independent deterrent, and a doctrine built around restraint rather than warfighting. This document traces the policy from its intellectual origins through the 1974 and 1998 tests, the formal 2003 doctrine, the approaches of successive prime ministers, the major controversies and criticisms it has attracted, and the contemporary position under the Modi government.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2025, India was estimated to hold about 180 nuclear warheads as of January 2025, a small increase over the previous year, and for the first time was assessed to hold marginally more warheads than Pakistan (around 170), though far fewer than China (around 600).
2. Foundational Principles
Indian nuclear policy rests on a set of consistent principles that have outlasted changes of government:
• Strategic autonomy: the deterrent must be wholly indigenous and under sovereign Indian control, free of external alliances or dependence.
• Opposition to a discriminatory order: India has refused to sign the NPT, which it regards as dividing the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” and has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
• Disarmament advocacy: India continues to call for universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament, a position dating back to the Nehru era and the Rajiv Gandhi disarmament plan of 1988.
• The bomb as a political, not a war-fighting, weapon: the arsenal exists to deter nuclear coercion, not to compel or to be used on the battlefield.
3. The Nuclear Doctrine (2003)
A draft doctrine was circulated by the National Security Advisory Board in August 1999. The Cabinet Committee on Security, under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, reviewed and adopted the formal doctrine on 4 January 2003. Its principal elements are:
• No First Use (NFU): nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
• Credible Minimum Deterrence: India maintains an arsenal sufficient to deter, not to match adversaries warhead-for-warhead.
• Massive retaliation: any nuclear attack will invite retaliation designed to inflict “unacceptable damage.”
• Chemical/biological caveat: India reserves the option of nuclear retaliation against a major chemical or biological weapons attack on India or its forces — a significant qualification to the NFU pledge.
• No use against non-nuclear states not aligned with nuclear-weapon powers.
• Civilian command and control: the decision to use nuclear weapons rests solely with the political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority (a Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister, and an Executive Council).
• Continued testing moratorium and commitment to global disarmament.
3.1 Command and Control
The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) was established in 2003. The Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the only body that can authorise the use of nuclear weapons. The Executive Council, chaired by the National Security Adviser, provides inputs and executes decisions. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), also created in 2003, manages and operates the actual arsenal.
3.2 The Nuclear Triad
India has developed a full nuclear triad, giving it an assured second-strike capability consistent with NFU:
| Leg | Principal systems | Notes |
| Land-based | Agni series (Agni-I to Agni-V/Agni-Prime), Prithvi | Agni-V is an intercontinental-range, canisterised missile; MIRV development under way. |
| Air-delivered | Mirage 2000, Jaguar, Rafale, Su-30MKI | Gravity bombs / stand-off delivery. |
| Sea-based | INS Arihant-class SSBNs with K-15 / K-4 SLBMs | INS Arihant completed its first deterrent patrol in 2018; the most survivable leg. |
4. Timeline of Landmark Events
| Year | Event |
| 1948 | Atomic Energy Commission established; Homi J. Bhabha leads India’s atomic programme. |
| 1954 | Department of Atomic Energy created under direct charge of PM Nehru. |
| 1968 | India declines to sign the NPT, calling it discriminatory. |
| 1974 | “Smiling Buddha” — first nuclear test at Pokhran, described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PM Indira Gandhi). |
| 1988 | Rajiv Gandhi presents a global Action Plan for a nuclear-weapon-free world at the UN. |
| 1994 | India proposes a bilateral “no first use” understanding to Pakistan. |
| 1998 | Pokhran-II (“Operation Shakti”): five tests; India declares itself a nuclear-weapon state (PM Vajpayee). |
| 1999 | Draft nuclear doctrine released by the National Security Advisory Board. |
| 2003 | Formal nuclear doctrine adopted (4 Jan); Nuclear Command Authority and Strategic Forces Command established. |
| 2005–08 | India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement negotiated; IAEA safeguards and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver (2008). |
| 2016–18 | India joins MTCR (2016), Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and Australia Group (2018); NSG membership still blocked. |
| 2018 | INS Arihant completes first deterrent patrol — triad operational. |
| 2019 | Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s Pokhran remarks reopen the NFU debate. |
| 2025 | SIPRI estimates ~180 Indian warheads; India–Pakistan clash (“Operation Sindoor”) raises escalation concerns. |
5. Key People and Institutions
| Figure | Role / contribution |
| Homi J. Bhabha | Father of India’s nuclear programme; founded the institutional base in the 1940s–50s. |
| Jawaharlal Nehru | Set the early dual-use, disarmament-oriented framing of the programme. |
| Raja Ramanna | Led the scientific team for the 1974 test. |
| A.P.J. Abdul Kalam | Key figure (DRDO) in the 1998 tests and missile programme; later President. |
| R. Chidambaram | Headed the Atomic Energy Commission during Pokhran-II. |
| Atal Bihari Vajpayee | PM who ordered Pokhran-II and oversaw adoption of the 2003 doctrine. |
| K. Subrahmanyam | Strategic thinker; chaired the group that drafted the 1999 doctrine. |
| Shivshankar Menon | NSA who articulated nuances of NFU (2010); later wrote on its rationale. |
6. Approaches of Different Prime Ministers
Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–64)
Built the scientific and institutional foundations while publicly emphasising peaceful uses and global disarmament. Nehru kept the weapons option ambiguous rather than foreclosed.
Indira Gandhi (1966–77, 1980–84)
Authorised the 1974 Pokhran test, framed as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The test demonstrated capability without an immediate declaration of weaponisation.
Rajiv Gandhi (1984–89)
Combined a 1988 global disarmament Action Plan at the UN with a quiet authorisation to advance weaponisation as the regional environment deteriorated.
P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991–96)
Prepared for testing in the mid-1990s but held back under international pressure, leaving the ground prepared for his successors.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004)
The decisive figure: ordered Pokhran-II in May 1998, declared India a nuclear-weapon state, and presided over the 2003 doctrine with its NFU pledge and command structure. He framed restraint and responsibility as central to India’s posture.
Manmohan Singh (2004–14)
Negotiated the landmark India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement and the 2008 NSG waiver, ending India’s nuclear isolation while reaffirming NFU and minimum deterrence.
Narendra Modi (2014–present)
Has maintained the doctrine in practice while overseeing visible modernisation (Agni-V, MIRVs, SSBN patrols). The 2014 BJP manifesto promised to “study in detail” and “revise and update” the doctrine, but Modi himself called NFU part of India’s cultural heritage and ruled out a formal review. Senior ministers have nonetheless periodically signalled ambiguity (see Section 8).
7. Controversies
• The 1974 “peaceful” label: the claim that the first test was peaceful drew international scepticism and triggered the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and tighter export controls.
• 1998 tests and sanctions: Pokhran-II prompted sanctions from the United States and others and sharp criticism over a perceived intelligence and non-proliferation failure.
• The chemical/biological caveat: critics argue that threatening nuclear retaliation for a chemical or biological attack contradicts the spirit of NFU and is hard to apply, especially against non-state actors.
• “Massive retaliation” vs. tactical threats: doubts persist over whether a promise of massive retaliation is credible against a limited or tactical nuclear strike, such as one using Pakistan’s short-range Nasr missile.
• The India–US nuclear deal: the 2008 arrangement was contested at home (as compromising autonomy) and abroad (as rewarding a non-NPT state).
8. Contemporary Stance of the Modi Government
In practice the Modi government has retained the 2003 doctrine, including NFU, while pursuing steady modernisation. Two strands run alongside each other.
8.1 Official continuity
After the 2014 election, despite a manifesto pledge to revisit the doctrine, the government did not initiate a formal review. In November 2018, after INS Arihant’s first deterrent patrol, Modi reaffirmed the responsible, restraint-based posture and the command-and-control framework. As recently as 2020, India publicly reiterated NFU against nuclear-weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear states, alongside its disarmament commitment.
8.2 Signals of ambiguity
In August 2019, after visiting Pokhran and amid heightened tension following the revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said India had strictly adhered to NFU but that “what happens in future depends on the circumstances.” Earlier, in 2016, then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had personally questioned the need for an NFU commitment (clarifying it was his personal view). Analysts read these as signals of conditional flexibility rather than a change of declared policy.
8.3 Modernisation and recent developments
SIPRI’s 2025 assessment notes that India is fielding canisterised missiles that can be stored with mated warheads and is pursuing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Some analysts argue this points toward a more ready posture, a shift from India’s traditional practice of keeping warheads de-mated from launchers in peacetime. The 2025 India–Pakistan military exchange (“Operation Sindoor”) renewed concern about escalation risk in a crisis.
9. Critics and Debates
Criticism comes from two opposite directions. Hawkish critics— including several retired military officers and strategists — argue that NFU and “massive retaliation” lack credibility against tactical nuclear threats and that the doctrine needs updating for a two-front (China and Pakistan) environment. Restraint-minded critics counter that abandoning NFU would be destabilising, would invite a costlier arms race, and would surrender the diplomatic value India derives from being seen as a responsible nuclear power. A third strand of criticism, from the disarmament community, questions weaponisation itself and India’s position outside the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
10. Conclusion
India’s nuclear policy has been remarkably stable in its declaratory form: an indigenous, civilian-controlled deterrent built on No First Use and credible minimum deterrence, paired with continued advocacy of disarmament. Yet beneath that continuity, the hardware and the rhetoric have evolved — a maturing triad, canisterised and MIRV-capable missiles, and periodic ministerial hints of conditional flexibility. The central tension for the coming decade is whether India can preserve a posture of restraint while modernising for a more demanding two-front security environment.
References and Further Reading
1. Ministry of External Affairs / Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” 4 January 2003 — the official text of the doctrine.
2. SIPRI Yearbook 2025, Chapter 6, “World Nuclear Forces” (Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. sipri.org/yearbook/2025/06
3. Arms Control Association, “India Considers No-First-Use Changes,” Arms Control Today, October 2019. armscontrol.org
4. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Much Ado About India’s No-First-Use Nuke Policy,” 2019. carnegieendowment.org
5. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Need for a Review.” csis.org
6. Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2016) — chapter on the rationale for NFU.
7. Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Praeger, 2008).
8. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California Press, 1999).
9. Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (2018).
10. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (RAND, 2001).
Note: figures (e.g. warhead counts) are open-source estimates and are revised annually. Verify against the latest SIPRI Yearbook before classroom use.
India’s Nuclear Policy — dennana.inPage